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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the behavior of economic agents facing situa-
tions in which they are required to team up with other agents. In particular,
we consider the case in which the future decisions of partners, albeit inde-
pendently taken, a¤ect the cumulative returns that they are committed to
share: for example, the case of group-lending programs, hiring decisions,
M&A decisions, and so on. We consider the case in which the future deci-
sions of partners, albeit independently taken, a¤ect the cumulative returns
that they are committed to share: for example, the case of group-lending
programs, hiring decisions, M&A decisions, and so on. We setup a simple
theoretical model and we tested it through a computerized lab experiment.
In our model economic agents decide individually and independently how
to allocate their wealth over a portfolio of lotteries, thus making decisions
under risk. We consider both the case in which agents act as individual
decision makers and the case in which they act strategically being part of
a two-person group. In this case they are allowed to choose their part-
ners and are fully committed to share group cumulative payo¤s with their
gambling partners. Our model predicts that: 1) agents choose to team up
1
with similar agents (i.e., agents with the same degree of risk aversion) in
homogeneous groups, and 2) agents make riskier decisions if they belong
to a homogeneous group with respect to the decisions they make as single
decision maker, thus exploiting the benets of mutual insurance.Our exper-
iment, run over a sample of 210 undergraduate Luiss-Guido Carli students,
conrmed our theoretical predictions.
1. Introduction
Many microcredit programs are group-lending programs: in most cases, group
lending programs imply joint liability with full commitment. In other words, even
if the decisions of each group member (for example, the choice of an investment
project among a set of available options) are independent, they substantially af-
fect the payo¤ of other group members. Moreover, the group formation process
can be either bottom-up (endogenous), when entrepreneurs form a group in order
to access credit, or top down (exogenous), when entrepreneurs that ask for credit
individually are randomly grouped together by microcredit institutions. Are in-
dividual decisions a¤ected by the interaction with other group members? What
kind of partners would entrepreneurs choose if they are allowed to? Is it optimal
to let entrepreneurs choose their own partners?
These are the questions that this article tries to answer; obviously, microcredit
group-lending programs are just an example. The same questions arise anytime
an economic agent must team up with another one whose future decisions, albeit
independently taken, will a¤ect the cumulative returns that they are committed to
share: for example, the same questions arise for hiring decisions, M&A decisions,
and so on.
In order to answer the questions stated above, we setup a simple theoretical
model and we tested it through a computerized lab experiment. In our model eco-
nomic agents decide individually and independently how to allocate their wealth
over a portfolio of lotteries, thus making decisions under risk. We consider both
the case in which agents act as individual decision makers and the case in which
they act strategically being part of a two-person group. In this case they are fully
committed to share group cumulative payo¤s with their gambling partners.
In the strategic case agents are allowed to choose their partners among a
population of heterogeneous agents, their heterogeneity being due to di¤erent risk
attitudes. Our model predicts that: 1) agents choose to team up with similar
agents (i.e., agents with the same degree of risk aversion) and 2) agents make
riskier decisions if they belong to a homogeneous group (i.e., a group formed by
two agents with the same degree of risk aversion) with respect to the decisions they
make as single decision maker, thus exploiting the benets of mutual insurance.
These results are driven by the assumption that lotteries are independent and
represent the theoretical predictions against which we evaluate our experimental
ndings. We briey discuss the case in which lotteries are correlated, postponing
a detailed analysis to a follow-up paper.
Our experiment, run over a sample of 210 undergraduate Luiss-Guido Carli
students, conrmed our theoretical predictions.
At rst glance, our paper seems to nd its reference in the experimental eco-
nomic literature on group decisions. However, this literature investigates the
reasons why group decisions di¤er from individual decisions, considering the case
in which group members do not act as single independent decision makers: groups
are more rational than single individuals ([2]), groups make e¢ cient use of infor-
mation ([1]), and groups are less risk averse than individuals ([3]). Actually, we
think that our contribution is closer to the economic literature on networks that
is concerned with issues such as homophily and similarity (...). In particular, we
think that our paper provides an economic rationale to the assumption that net-
work formation is boosted when network members display similar characteristics.
Four sections and an appendix follow this introduction. In the rst one we de-
scribe the theoretical model and derive our predictions; in the second we describe
the experimental design; in the third we illustrate the experimental results; nally,
in the fourth we summarize our ndings and suggest some possible extension of
our research. The Appendix contains the instructions that we provided to our
experimental subjects.
2. Theoretical Predictions
In this section we model a simple theoretical framework. The theoretical predic-
tions that we derive from this model represent the benchmark against which we
will test our experimental results.
This section is divided into three subsections: in the rst one we describe
the basic model; in the second one we analyze individual decisions; nally, in
the third one we introduce strategic interaction (i.e., we setup a game theoretical
model) and we derive equilibrium results under the assumption that individuals
are allowed to choose their gambling partners.
2.1. The model
Agents are endowed with one unit of capital which they must allocate to a portfolio
of lotteries. There are two lotteries available: the rst one is a binary risky
lottery that for each unit invested returns r > 1 with probability p and zero
with probability (1   p); the second one is a degenerate lottery that returns 1
for each unit of capital invested (it is a storage technology). We assume that the
risky lottery has a (strictly) higher expected return that the degenerate lottery,
so to be appealing also to risk averse investors. As for agentspreferences we
assume that they are of the expected utility form, with Bernoulli utility functions
over wealth u(w; ) where  is a risk aversion parameter. We assume that utility
is monotonically increasing and strictly concave in wealth. We normalise the
Bernoulli utility function so that u(0; ) = 0;8: Formally:
Assumption 1. The risky lottery has larger expected return than the degenerate
lottery: pr > 1:
Assumption 2. Individual utilities over wealth u(w; ) are such that @u(w;)
@w
> 0,
@2u(w;)
@w2
< 0, and u(0; ) = 0.
Agents are heterogeneous in their risk aversion parameter. In particular, if
the risk aversion parameter ranges between a lower bound  and an upper bound
, agentsrisk preferences are distributed on a double continuum between  and
. This assumption guarantees that, for each risk aversion parameter b, there are
two (and no more than two) agents with preferences represented by u(w;b). We
index agents by i = 1; 2; ::: and hence denote agent is utility function by u(w; i):
2.2. Individual decisions
Denote by (x; y) a portfolio of lotteries, where x 2 [0; 1] and y = (1   x) are the
portfolio weights in the risky and degenerate lotteries respectively. It follows that
the expected utility of agent i is equal to:
pu(xr + 1  x; i) + (1  p)u(1  x; i)
Standard expected utility maximisation implies that the optimal portfolio
weight in the risky lottery x(i) satises the following rst order condition:
p(r   1) @u
@w
(xr + 1  x; i) = (1  p) @u
@w
(1  x; i) (1)
It is easy to show that under the assumption of strict concavity of the utility
function the solution to the maximisation problem x(i) is unique. Also, as long
as pr > 1 a risk averse agent will choose x(i) > 0.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a unique solution x(i)
to the maximisation problem (1). Also, x(i) > 0.
Proof. Consider the rst order condition (1):
p(r   1) @u
@w
(xr + 1  x; i)  (1  p) @u
@w
(1  x; i) = 0
Di¤erentiating the left hand side with respect to x gives:
p(r   1)2 @
2u
@w2
(xr + 1  x; i) + (1  p) @
2u
@w2
(1  x; i) < 0
Given that the left hand side of (1) is a monotonically decreasing function, the
value of x(i) is unique. Next we prove that x(i) > 0. We proceed by way of
contradiction. Suppose that x(i) = 0, then condition (1) becomes:
p(r   1) @u
@w
(1; i)  (1  p) @u
@w
(1; i) = 0
which cannot hold when pr > 1 (assumption 1).
Next we assume that agentspreferences are such that the relationship x(i)
between individual portfolio choice and risk aversion parameter is one-to-one (bi-
jective). Proposition 1 already establishes that for each value of i we obtain one
and only one optimal portfolio composition x. We further assume that for each
portfolio composition x there is only one value of risk aversion parameter such
that the portfolio is indeed optimal.
Assumption 3. The function x() admits an inverse x 1(x()) = :
Some notable functional forms satisfy the requirement posed by assumption 3.
In particular, the cases of constant absolute risk aversion and of constant relative
risk aversion.
Example 1. Consider the case of constant absolute risk aversion:
u(w; ) =  e w
First order condition for an optimum portfolio composition gives:
p(r   1)e (xr+1 x) = (1  p)e (1 x)
Hence optimal investment in risky lottery is equal to:
x() =
log p(r 1)
1 p
r
This function admits an inverse:
(x) =
log p(r 1)
1 p
xr
Example 2. Consider the case of constant relative risk aversion:
u(w; ) =
w1 
1  
First order condition for an optimum portfolio composition gives:
p(r   1)(xr + 1  x)  = (1  p)(1  x) 
Hence optimal investment in risky lottery has to satisfy:
1  x
xr + 1  x =

p(r   1)
1  p
  1

Notice that the expression on the left hand side is monotone in x. Hence there is
only one value for x given  and vice versa.
The role of assumption 3 is that it will be possible to infer each agents pref-
erences from their individual risky choice.
2.3. Strategic Interaction
Assume now that agents choose a gambling partner prior to making any invest-
ment decisions. If two agents i and j are gambling partners, they both decide
simultaneously and independently on their preferred portfolio allocation over the
two available lotteries. Any winnings are equally shared across gambling partners.
We assume that the outcomes of the risky lotteries in which agents i and j invest
are independent. Under this assumption, expected utility of agent i when agent
js portfolio weight in the risky lottery is xj is equal to:
p2u

xir + (1  xi) + xjr + (1  xj)
2
; i

+ p(1  p)u

xir + (1  xi) + (1  xj)
2
; i

+
+p(1  p)u

(1  xi) + xjr + (1  xj)
2
; i

+ (1  p)2u

(1  xi) + (1  xj)
2
; i

The game is in two stages. In the rst stage, agent i chooses a gambling
partner. In the second stage, the two gambling partners decide how to allocate
their endowment across the two lotteries. At the end of the second stage, any
uncertainty is revealed and payo¤s are distributed.
We can show that this game admits a unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilib-
rium (SPNE) where in the rst stage agents choose a gambling partner with equal
preferences over risky outcomes and in the second stage partners invest more in
the risky lottery than they would if they were investing individually.
Lemma 1. Optimal gambling partner choice is such that j = i.
Proof. We solve for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). Hence we proceed
backwards. In the second stage agent i chooses her optimal investment in the risky
lottery x(i; x(j)), given her own risk aversion parameter i and given the choice
of her partner x(j): For notational convenience denote by xi and xj agents i and
js choices respectively. For any given choice of agent j, xj, the optimal investment
in the risky lottery by agent i solves:
p2
@u
@w

xir + (1  xi) + xjr + (1  xj)
2
; i

r   1
2
+
+p(1  p) @u
@w

xir + (1  xi) + (1  xj)
2
; i

r   1
2
= p(1  p) @u
@w

(1  xi) + xjr + (1  xj)
2
; i

1
2
+
+(1  p)2 @u
@w

(1  xi) + (1  xj)
2
; i

1
2
Similarly, agent j takes agent is investment choice as given and solves:
p2
@u
@w

xir + (1  xi) + xjr + (1  xj)
2
; j

r   1
2
+
+p(1  p) @u
@w

xir + (1  xi) + (1  xj)
2
; j

r   1
2
= p(1  p) @u
@w

(1  xi) + xjr + (1  xj)
2
; j

1
2
+
+(1  p)2 @u
@w

(1  xi) + (1  xj)
2
; j

1
2
Notice now that, for i = j, the rst order conditions of agents i and j coincide
and correspond to a global optimum for player i (and j). In fact, gambling partner
j with the same preferences as agent i chooses for himself the same portfolio of
lotteries that agent i would have chosen for her partner, had he been free to
optimise both with respect to her own portfolio and with respect to her partners.
Given that second period expected payo¤s correspond to a global maximum for
agent i whenever i = j, rst stage choice falls on a partner with equal risk
aversion parameter.
What is crucial for the result in lemma 1 is our assumption of independence
across lotteries played by the two gambling partners. By choosing gambling part-
ners that have the same risk preferences as themselves, agents manage to duplicate
their preferred lottery combination. Given that lotteries are independent, it is op-
timal to do so. Although we do not carry out here a full analysis for the case of
correlation across lotteries played by the two gambling partners, it would seem
that results are qualitatively di¤erent for the case of correlation. In particular,
it would seem that while in the case of independence (analysed here) partners
investment shares in the risky lottery are strategic complements; in presence of
positive correlation, partnersinvestment shares are strategic substitutes: when
one agent invests more in the risky lottery, the other agent invests less.
Example 3. Assume that there is perfect positive correlation across the two risky
lotteries played by the gambling partners. First order condition for agent i gives:
p
@u
@w

(xi + xj)r + 2  (xi + xj)
2
; i

(r   1) = (1  p) @u
@w

2  (xi + xj)
2
; i

Given that what matters for agent i is the sum of the investments in the risky
lottery, the two investment shares are strategic substitutes.
Next we show that the optimal choice in the second stage of the game involves
a larger share of investment in the risky lottery compared to x(i), i.e. the
investment share in the risky lottery in the case of individual choice.
Lemma 2. In the second stage gambling partners invest in the risky lottery a
share of endowment x(i) > x(i).
Proof. We compare the conditions at the margin in the case of choice with a
partner and individual choice. Recall that the optimal risky investment in the
case of the individual choice solves:
p(r   1) @u
@w
(xr + 1  x; i) = (1  p) @u
@w
(1  x; i) (2)
The rst order condition when choosing with a gambling partner is:
p2
@u
@w

xir + (1  xi) + xjr + (1  xj)
2
; i

r   1
2
+
+p(1  p) @u
@w

xir + (1  xi) + (1  xj)
2
; i

r   1
2
= p(1  p) @u
@w

(1  xi) + xjr + (1  xj)
2
; i

1
2
+
+(1  p)2 @u
@w

(1  xi) + (1  xj)
2
; i

1
2
which can be rewritten as:
p(r   1)
24 p @u@w xir+(1 xi)+xjr+(1 xj)2 ; i+
+(1  p) @u
@w

xir+(1 xi)+(1 xj)
2
; i
 35 =
(1  p)
24 p @u@w  (1 xi)+xjr+(1 xj)2 ; i+
+(1  p) @u
@w

(1 xi)+(1 xj)
2
; i
 35
In equilibrium xi = xj = x: Hence:
p(r   1)

p @u
@w
(xr + 1  x; i)+
+(1  p) @u
@w
 
xr
2
+ 1  x; i
  = (3)
(1  p)

p @u
@w
 
xr
2
+ 1  x; i

+
+(1  p) @u
@w
(1  x; i)

We represent conditions (2) and (3) graphically. Consider the individual rst
order condition (2) rst. The left hand side is decreasing in x. In fact:
@2u
@w@x
(xr + 1  x; i) = @
2u
@w2
(xr + 1  x; i)(r   1) < 0
Also, it ranges between p(r   1) @u
@w
(r; i) (for x = 1) and p(r   1) @u@w (1; i) (for
x = 0). The right hand side in (2) is increasing in x:
@2u
@w@x
(1  x; i) = @
2u
@w2
(1  x; i)( 1) > 0
and it ranges between (1  p) @u
@w
(1; i) (for x = 0) and (1  p) @u@w (0; i) (for x = 1).
Conditions at the margin for the individual choice are represented in gure 1.
p(r-1)u’(1)
0    1 x
(1-p)u’(1)
(1-p)u’(0)
p(r-1)u’(r)
        x*
Figure 1: Individual choice.
Consider now rst order condition (3). Notice that
p
@u
@w
(xr + 1  x; i) + (1  p) @u
@w

xr
2
+ 1  x; i

>
@u
@w
(xr + 1  x; i) for x > 0
=
@u
@w
(xr + 1  x; i) = @u
@w
(1; i) for x = 0
p
@u
@w

xr
2
+ 1  x; i

+ (1  p) @u
@w
(1  x; i)
<
@u
@w
(1  x; i) for x > 0
=
@u
@w
(1  x; i) = @u
@w
(1; i) for x = 0
Hence compared to the conditions at the margin we had for the individual choice
here we have that the left hand side can be represented graphically by a curve that
has the same vertical intercept and lies entirely above p(r 1)  @u
@w
(xr+1 x; i);
while the right hand side can be represented by a curve that has the same vertical
intercept and lies entirely below (1  p) @u
@w
(1  x; i). It follows that x > x:
p(r-1)u’(1)
0    1
x
   1
(1-p)u’(1)
(1-p)u’(0)
p(r-1)u’(r)
        x* x**
Thin ‘curves’ correspond to the individual choice
Thick ‘curves’ correspond to the strategic choice when y = x
Figure 2: Risk sharing with a gambling partner.
The two agents risk-share, hence more risks are taken (see gure 2).
Lemma 1 and 2 constitute our theoretical prediction.
Proposition 2. In the game with gambling partner choice, there is a unique
SPNE: in the rst stage agents choose gambling partners with equal risk aversion
parameter; in the second stage their risk-share by taking on more risks than they
would individually: x() > x().
Proof. By lemma 1 and 2.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that choosing a gambling partner with
the same risk aversion as themselves, agents can exploit the benets of mutual
insurance. More precisely, they have access to a new lottery with the same return
and lower variance, hence choosing to allocate a larger fraction of their wealth on
the risky lottery.
3. Experimental Design
Our computerized experiment consists of 2 treatments, T1 and T2, in which ex-
perimental subjects are required to make decisions under risk. Each treatment
is divided into 3 rounds, R1, R2, and R3: the rst round is about individual
decisions and it is the same in both treatments; in the following two rounds ex-
perimental subjects keep on making individual decisions, but they are grouped in
pairs and they equally share the aggregate payo¤ of the pair, with no regard to
individual contribution. The di¤erence between T1 and T2 is in the group forma-
tion mechanism: in T1 experimental subjects are randomly matched, while in T2
they are allowed to choose their partner. In both treatments, in R2 experimental
subjects have no information about the individual decisions undertaken by others
in the rst round, while in R3 they can observe the decisions undertaken in R1
by their potential partners.
Throughout the experiment subjects were required to decide upon the optimal
allocation of 5 experimental credits (EC) over two lotteries: the rst lottery (Lot-
tery 1) paid 1 or 3 EC with equal probabilities; the second lottery paid 1 or 5 EC
with probabilities equal to 0.8 and 0.2 respectively. So, lotteries were designed
such that Lottery 1 displayed both a lower expected return and a lower variance
than Lottery 2. In the remaining sections we will refer to Lottery 2 as "the risky
lottery".
It is worth providing more details about the group formation mechanism that
we employed in T2. After the rst round, each subject can propose to one of
the other (9) subjects to form a pair1. If the proposal is accepted, the pair is
formed and it cannot be broken apart until the next round starts. In R2 subjects
make their proposals without knowing the individual decisions undertaken in R1
by their potential partners; in R3 they are allowed to see what their potential
partners did in R1 before making their proposals.
We recruited 210 Luiss - Guido Carli University undergradute students from
the faculties of Law, Economics, and Political Sciencesthrough ORSEE recruit-
ment system. We ran 21 ten-person sessions: 140 subjects performed T1, 70
performed T2. At the end of each session experimental subjects were paid cash
immediately. The average payo¤ was 8 Euros, the maximum payo¤ was 12.5
Euros.
The instructions distributed to experimental subjects are in the Appendix of
1Experimental subjects are displayed on the screen in an anonymous way. In particular, they
are labeled as ...
this paper.
4. Experimental Results
In this section we will describe the results of the computerized experiment run
at Luiss - Guido Carli University of Rome over a sample of 210 undergraduate
students. In particular, we will focus on the comparison between the experimental
results and the predictions of our theoretical model.
This section is divided into three subsections: in the rst subsection, we will
comment on the individual decisions made by our experimental subjects; in the
second one, we will describe how experimental subjects chose their gambling part-
ners; in the last one, we will compare individual decisions with group decisions.
4.1. Individual Decisions
A summary of the individual decisions under risk of our experimental subjects (i.e.,
the individual decisions over the allocation of the initial amount of EC between
the two lotteries described in the previous section) is contained in Table 1.
Table 1: Individual Decisions - EC on Lottery 1
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Number of Observations 70 140
Mean 2.6 2.6
Variance 0.98 1.41
It is worth noticing that there is no di¤erence between the individual deci-
sions made under the two treatments. This result is relevant because subjects
under Treatment 2 knew from the beginning of the treatment that their individ-
ual decisions could a¤ect the search of gambling partners in the last round of the
treatment. A T-test run over the two distributions of individual decisions con-
rmed that the decisions made by our experimental subjects are not statistically
di¤erent under the two treatments.
Under Expected Utility Theory (EUT) both risk neutral and risk loving sub-
jects should not allocate EC on Lottery 1 because Lottery 2 displays a higher
expected return. As it is summarized in Table 1 the mean is di¤erent from zero
under both treatments. Moreover, only 5 subjects out of 210 decided to allo-
cate zero EC on Lottery 1, so the risk aversion assumption made in the previous
sections is strongly supported by experimental evidence.
4.2. Gambling Partner Selection
The main result in terms of gambling partner selection is that our experimental
subjects, when provided with information about other subjectsindividual deci-
sions, chose to join partners who displayed a similar degree of risk aversion, as
predicted by our theoretical model.
In order to evaluate the di¤erences between subjects belonging to the same
two-person group, we dened a measure of the intra-group distance. Let us call xi
the amount of EC allocated by subject i on Lottery 1 in the individual decision
round of both treatments. Then, the intra-group distance (D) is the following:
D  (xi   x i)2
First, we will compare the average intra-group distance in Round 3 across
Treatment 1 and Treatment 2. Let us recall that in the third round of both
treatments each subject was allowed to view the individual decisions of the other
9 subjects who were simultaneously performing their experimental tasks. However,
while in Treatment 1 groups were randomly formed, in Treatment 2 each subject
could in principle choose his/her gambling partner.
Table 2 shows that the intra-group distance is di¤erent across the two treat-
ments.
Table 2: Group Formation - Intra-Group Distance
Round 3 - Treatment 1 Round 3 - Treatment 2
Number of Observations 70 140
Mean 2.70 1.51
Variance 4.88 10.9
A T-test run over the two disributions of intra-group distances conrmed that
the two sample means are statistically di¤erent (at a 1% signicance level).
Since we considered this result crucial, we performed a two step-robustness
analysis based on the decisions made under Treatment 2: rst, we compared the
group composition in Round 2 with the group composition in Round 3; then, we
looked at the sequential order in which groups were formed in Round 3.
The rst comparison is aimed at understanding whether information mattered
in the gambling partner search process; in fact, in both Round 2 and Round
3 subjects could in principle choose their favourite gambling partners; however,
while in Round 3 they knew the individual decisions of their potential partners,
in Round 2 they did not know them. Our experimental result is striking: 50
groups out of 70 formed in Round 2 were changed in Round 3 (i.e., information
about individual decisions induced more than 70% of previously formed groups to
change their composition).
As for the sequential order in which groups were formed, this analysis is rele-
vant because in Round 3 subjects could propose themselves as gambling partners
only to subjects not already teamed with others. So, experimental subjects who
did not propose themselves quick enough were forced to join left over subjects
against their will. What we observe from our experimental data is that the av-
erage intra-group distance for the rst three groups formed in each experimental
session is 0.5, well below the sample mean in Table 2; hence, the di¤erence between
the intra-group distance across the two treatments is underestimated if timing is
not considered. This result conrms the willingness of experimental subjects to
choose partners who displayed a similar degree of risk aversion in the individual
decision round.
4.3. Individual Vs Paired Decisions
The main objective of this paper is to compare individual decisions with group de-
cisions. We wish to remind that our theoretical model predicts that in equilibrium
group decisions are riskier than individual ones.
Our experimental results seem to conrm our theoretical predictions: in fact,
in both treatments, subjects made riskier choices in Round 3 than in Round 1, as
Table 3 below claries.
Table 3: Individual Vs Paired Decisions - EC on Lottery 1
T1 - Round 1 T1 - Round 3 T2 - Round 1 T2 - Round 3
N. Obs. 70 70 140 140
Mean 2.60 2.10 2.61 2.36
Variance 0.98 1.69 1.41 1.54
In our experimental environment a lower amount of EC on Lottery 1 implies
riskier decisions. So, as it is evident from Table 3, group decisions were riskier
than individual decisions. The mean di¤erences summarized by Table 3 have been
tested through a set of t-tests. In both treatments the mean di¤erences between
individual and group decisions are statistically signicative.
However, the theoretical predictions of our model do not refer to groups, rather
they refer to "homogeneous" groups: in fact, our model predicts that subjects be-
longing to homogenous pairs make riskier choices. In order to check for this result,
we divided our sample into two subsamples: the rst subsample (Subsample H)
contains homogeneous pairs, the second one (Subsample D) contains dishomoge-
neous pairs. In particular, in SubsampleH we consider all pairs whose intra-group
distance is either 0 or 1; in Subsample D we consider all remaining pairs. The
following table summarizes our experimental evidence.
Table 4: EC on Lottery 1 - Subsample H Vs Subsample D
T1 - Round 1 T1 - Round 3 T2 - Round 1 T2 - Round 3
Subsample H D H D H D H D
N. Obs. 39 31 39 31 110 30 110 30
Mean 2.63 2.56 2.03 2.20 2.74 2.10 2.43 2.00
Variance 0.86 2.06 1.45 1.96 0.70 1.84 1.30 2.50
Table 4 conrms that generally speaking group decisions were riskier than in-
dividual decisions. However, Table 4 that considers the two subsamples separately
conveys a larger amount of information:
1. Our t-tests state that only for homogeneous subsamples individual and group
decisions are statistically di¤erent (at a 2% signicance level);
2. Moreover, as it is clear from Table 4, in Treatment 2 experimental subjects
belonging to dishomogeneous pairs made riskier decisions than subjects be-
longing to homogeneous pairs.
The rst nding fully conrms the result of our theoretical model. First,
experimental subjects chose to join other subjects displaying a similar degree of
risk aversion; then, being part of an homogeneous pair, they made riskier choices,
thus fully exploiting the benets of an implicit mutual insurance.
The second nding is more di¢ cult to explain in terms of our theoretical model.
A possible explanation is that more risk loving subjects did not care about nding
an homogeneous gambling partner, so they did not hurry to nd one (hence ending
up in a dishomogeneous group), and nally conrmed their individual choice.
Another plausible interpretation is that a fraction of our experimental sample
did not recognize the benets of mutual insurance and made identical individual
and group decisions. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the fraction
of individuals who did not behave accordingly with our theoretical predictions is
much smaller under Treatment 2: in fact, in Treatment 2 experimental subjects
were forced to consider the strategic implications of partner selection, thus were
forced to reason about mutual insurance benets. Probably, the randomizations of
Treatment 1 induced experimental subjects to underestimate the potential benets
of mutual insurance. However, this interpretation fails to explain why subjects
unaware of mutual indurance benets happen to be less risk averse than others.
5. Concluding Remarks
We investigated the behavior of economic agents facing situations in which they
are required to team up with other agents. In particular, we considered the case
in which the future decisions of partners, albeit independently taken, a¤ect the
cumulative returns that they are committed to share: for example, the case of
group-lending programs, hiring decisions, M&A decisions, and so on. We did it
from both a theoretical and an experimental point of view.
In our theoretical model we proved that:
1) Whenever agents are allowed to choose a gambling partner, they decide
to team up with other agents that display the same degree of risk aversion as
themselves;
2) Whenever agents belong to a homogeneous group (i.e., to a group formed by
two agents with the same degree of risk aversion), they make riskier decisions with
respect to the decisions that they make as single decision maker, thus exploiting
mutual insurance benets.
From an experimental point of view, the main nding is that the experimental
results conrm our theoretical predictions. In fact, experimental subjects chose
to join other subjects displaying a similar degree of risk aversion; moreover, being
part of an homogeneous pair, they made riskier choices, thus fully exploiting the
benets of an implicit mutual insurance.
Our research can be extended in many directions. For example, the theoreti-
cal model could take into consideration correlated lotteries and the experimental
setup could be changed accordingly. Moreover, our experimental results could be
analyzed using more sophisticated econometric techniques. Finally, the potential
of our results in terms of real world applications could be further exploited.
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